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AN INTUITIONISTIC FORMULA HIERARCHY BASED ON
HIGH-SCHOOL IDENTITIES
TAUS BROCK-NANNESTAD AND DANKO ILIK
Abstract. We revisit intuitionistic proof theory from the point of view of the
formula isomorphisms arising from high-school identities. Using a representa-
tion of formulas as exponential polynomials, we ﬁrst observe that invertible
proof rules of sequent calculi for intuitionistic proposition logic correspond to
equations using high-school identities, and that hence a so called high-school
variant of a proof system can be obtained that is complete for provability, but
contains no more than the non-invertible proof rules. We further show that,
for proof calculi that do not include contraction, like the G4ip sequent calculus
of Vorob’ev, Hudelmaier, and Dyckhoﬀ, it may also be possible to interpret
the non-invertible rules as strict inequalities between exponential polynomials.
Finally, we extend the exponential polynomial analogy to ﬁrst-order quanti-
ﬁers, showing that it gives rise to a simple intuitionistic hierarchy of formulas,
the ﬁrst one that classiﬁes formulas up to isomorphism, and proceeds along
the same equivalences that lead to the classical arithmetical hierarchy.
1. Introduction
Classical logic has a standard semantics independent of the notion of proof.
One could for instance do model theory without ever involving proof systems. For
intuitionistic logic, however, the intended meaning of the logical connectives makes
its semantics inherently proof-theoretic. For example, the intuitionistic validity of
F ∨G amounts to either having a proof of F or a proof of G.
Equivalence of formulas is perhaps also more subtle intuitionistically. First,
whereas in classical first-order logic any formula can be characterized as belonging
at an appropriate level of the arithmetical hierarchy through an equivalent formula
in prenex form, in intuitionistic logic, the existence of an equally versatile hierarchy
appears to be elusive (see Section 5). Second, the usual notion of equivalence which
denotes implication in both directions is not semantics-, that is, proof-preserving:
for instance, the equivalence F ∧F ↔ F only allows preserving proofs between the
left-hand side and the right-hand side for some special cases of F . For instance, if
F is a disjunction where each disjunct is provable. In this case, there would be four
different possible proofs of the left-hand side, but only two different possible proofs
of the right-hand side.
Isomorphism of formulas seems to be a better notion when our aim is to preserve
semantics across an equivalence. This strong notion of equivalence of formulas,
F ∼= G,
asks not only that F ↔ G, but also that there exist proof transformations φ and
ψ, such that given any proof D1 of F and D2 of G, we have that
ψ(φ(D1)) ≡ D1 and φ(ψ(D2)) ≡ D2.
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However, adopting isomorphism as the standard intuitionistic notion of equivalence
makes us stumble upon another fundamental problem: having a good definition of
identity of proofs, “≡”, is itself open since the early days of intuitionistic proof
theory (see [1] and Section 5).
For all of these reasons, the study of formal proof systems is perhaps more press-
ing for intuitionistic logic and constructive mathematics, than it is for classical
mathematics. And, as constructive reasoning plays an important role in proof as-
sistant software, these problems are also directly relevant to formal specification and
verification of programs, not to mention the foundations of popular mathematical
theories with intuitionistic cores, such as type theory and topos theory.
In this paper, we contribute to the intuitionistic proof theory related to the
aforementioned problems by means of the fresh perspective of intuitionistic formulas
seen as exponential polynomials.
In Section 2, we shall show that the invertible (i.e. asynchronous [2]) proof rules
of G4ip [3], Vorob’ev, Hudelmaier, and Dyckhoff’s sequent calculus for intuition-
istic propositional logic, present simple isomorphisms that arise from high-school
identities, and that hence one can build a so called high-school variant (HS) of
G4ip, which is complete for provability, but does not need to contain invertible
(i.e. asynchronous) proof rules. The calculus HS is thus the first proof system for
intuitionistic logic that relies on the essential non-invertible (i.e. synchronous) rules
only.
Furthermore, being a contraction-free variant of LJ, G4ip allows an interpreta-
tion of non-invertible rules as in-equalities between exponential polynomials. This
is shown in Section 3, opening the possibility to use arithmetical or analytic argu-
ments in intuitionistic proof theory: we give an application to termination of proof
search.
In Section 4, we shall show how the analogy between formulas and exponential
polynomials can be extended to the first-order quantifiers, obtaining a normal form
for intuitionistic first-order formulas and a novel intuitionistic “arithmetical” hier-
archy that preserves formula isomorphism, and hence identity of proofs. We believe
that the proposed hierarchy can play a roˆle similar to that of the arithmetical hi-
erarchy for classical logic (which exists since the 1920s), as it is both simple and
semantics-preserving.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes our results and discusses related work.
2. High-School Sequent Calculus
Identifying formulas of intuitionistic propositional logic with exponential polyno-
mials – by writing F ∧G as FG, F ∨G as F +G, F → G as GF , and treating atomic
formulas as variables – allows generalizing the notion of validity of equations in the
standard model of positive natural numbers by the notion of formula isomorphism.
Namely, if we take F ∼= G as defined in Section 1, the following implication holds
(see [4] for a proof):
F ∼= G =⇒ N+  F = G.
That is, if F and G are isomorphic intuitionistic formulas, then the corresponding
arithmetical expressions must be equal, when the variables contained therein are
interpreted as ranging over the positive natural numbers.
Reversing this implication poses interesting meta-theoretic problems (see [5, 6]).
Nevertheless, we shall not need in this paper anything more than the isomorphisms
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arising from the twelve high-school identities (HSI axioms):
F = F (1)
F +G = G+ F (2)
(F +G) +H = F + (G+H) (3)
FG = GF (4)
(FG)H = F (GH) (5)
F (G+H) = FG+ FH (6)
F1 = F (7)
F 1 = F (8)
1F = 1 (9)
FG+H = FGFH (10)
(FG)H = FHGH (11)
(FG)H = FGH . (12)
If we close these axioms under appropriate equality and congruence rules (see for
instance [6]), we can talk about formal derivability of an equation, HSI ⊢ F = G,
for which we have:
HSI ⊢ F = G =⇒ F ∼= G.
Every derivable equation can thus be also seen as establishing a strong intuitionistic
equivalence.
This correspondence between formulas and exponential polynomials suggests in-
vestigating the rules of intuitionistic proof systems as rules for transforming ex-
ponential polynomials. Let us start with the invertible rules of the intuitionistic
propositional sequent calculus, LJ, written out in two columns, the left one giving
a rule in formula notation, while the right one gives the same rule in exponential
polynomial notation.
F,Γ→ G
Γ→ (F → G)
GFΓ
(GF )
Γ
(→r)
Γ→ F Γ→ G
Γ→ F ∧G
FΓGΓ
(FG)Γ
(∧r)
F,Γ→ H G,Γ→ H
(F ∨G),Γ→ H
HFΓHGΓ
H(F+G)Γ
(∨l)
The formula notation uses the identification of the usual sequent turnstile symbol
“⊢” and implication “→” — the former is simply the top-most occurrence of the
latter (implication is right-associative). The polynomial notation in addition uses
the identification of the comma and “∧”, up to multiset equality for “contexts”,
that is, up to commutativity of multiplication for polynomials corresponding to
contexts.
We can thus see that the usual invertible rules of LJ correspond to polynomial
simplification rules. Since these rules are either instances or compositions of high-
school identities, the rules are also valid as formula-, that is, sequent isomorphisms.
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The same is true for the additional invertible rules sometimes present, such as the
ones of the sequent calculus G4ip [3]:
(F → G→ H),Γ→ I
(G ∧ F → H),Γ→ I
I(H
G)FΓ
IHGFΓ
(→∧l )
(F → H), (G→ H),Γ→ I
(F ∨G→ H),Γ→ I
IH
FHGΓ
IHF+GΓ
(→∨l )
F,G,Γ→ H
(F ∧G),Γ→ H
HFGΓ
HFGΓ
. (∧l)
In order to express a complete version of the LJ sequent calculus in terms of
exponential polynomials, we need to consider the non-invertible proof rules as well.
In particular, it suffices to consider the remaining rules of G4ip:
P,Γ→ P PPΓ
(axiom)
Γ→ F
Γ→ F ∨G
FΓ
(F +G)Γ
(∨1r)
Γ→ G
Γ→ F ∨G
GΓ
(F +G)Γ
(∨2r)
F, P,Γ→ G
(P → F ), P,Γ→ G
GFPΓ
GFPPΓ
(→Pl )
(G→ H),Γ→ (F → G) H,Γ→ I
((F → G)→ H),Γ→ I
(GF )H
GΓIHΓ
IHG
F Γ
, (→→l )
where P denotes a prime (i.e. atomic) formula. For simplicity, we do not give a
special treatment for intuitionistic absurdity, or negation; for the purpose of this
paper, ⊥ would just be an atomic proposition as any other, and ¬ would be replaced
by implication.
Due to the absence of contraction in G4ip, all of the non-invertible rules F
G
satisfy
the arithmetic inequality F ≤ G when variables are interpreted in {n ∈ N | n ≥ 2}.1
We shall prove this in Section 3, since the case of (→→l ) is not obvious.
The goal for the present section will be to derive from G4ip a proof system that
will not contain any of the (bureaucratic and non-informative) invertible rules. This
system, written with the help of exponential polynomial notation will be called the
high-school variant of G4ip (HS). Proofs in HS will only consist of the translations
of the informative rules of G4ip. But, please note, that the procedure for deriving
HS is generic, and could be performed on another version of LJ. The advantage of
working with G4ip is that the number of different non-invertible rules necessary to
get a complete system is minimal.
1The rule (→P
l
) would have been invertible, if by invertible we only meant equivalent and not
strongly equivalent (i.e. isomorphic) premise and conclusion.
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The starting idea is to use the analytic transformation,
GF = eF logG = exp(F log(G)),
in order to decompose binary exponentiation (i.e. implication) in terms of unary
exponentiation and the logarithmic function, just as the approach to normal forms
in exponential fields [7].2
As already analyzed in a previous unpublished study of the βη-equations for
terms of normalized type [8], the exp-log decomposition of implication leads to a
normal form of propositional formulas that is obtained by left-to-right rewriting
using the high-school identities (isomorphisms) (10), (11), (12), and (6).
There is some liberty in determining the order in which to apply the equations.
One precise and structurally recursive procedure for computing the normal form
of a formula (i.e. sequent), ‖−‖, suitable for establishing Theorem 1, is given in
Figure 1. It maps any formula to an isomorphic formula from the class of exp-
log normal forms (E), defined by the mutually inductively defined classes of base
formulas (B), conjunctions (C), and disjunctions (D):
B ∋ b ::= p | d
C ∋ c ::= (c1 → b1) ∧ · · · ∧ (cn → bn) (n ≥ 0)
D ∋ d ::= c1 ∨ · · · ∨ cn (n ≥ 2)
E ∋ b ::= c | d,
that is,
B ∋ b ::= p | d E ∋ b ::= c | d
C ∋ c ::=
n≥0∏
i=1
bcii D ∋ d ::=
n≥2∑
i=1
ci,
where p denotes a prime formula. The variables p, c, d, e, possibly with indexing
subscripts, will always be used to stand for members of the corresponding class.
The unit 1 (i.e. the formula ⊤) is not a prime formula, but rather denotes the
nullary product
∏0
i=1 b
ci
i .
The formal definitions from Figure 1 are a beautified transcription of definitions
carried out in the Coq proof assistant.3 The function ‖−‖ is defined simultaneously
with the |−|-function, whose purpose is to guarantee the desired ordering of HSI’s,
i.e. that equation (6) is not applied at the base of exponentiation before equation
(11). It uses the operations ⊕ , × , ⋉ , ⋊ , ⇑ , and ↑ . The intuition behind these
operations is as follows.
The function ⊕ turns a binary plus (disjunction) into an n-ary one, more
precisely, it flattens a tree of binary +-constructors into a tail-inductive list. The
function × does the analogous thing for multiplication (conjunction).
2This hints at interpreting implication “classically”, that is, in terms of two distinct “negation”
symbols, ¬exp and ¬log, such that
F → G := ¬exp(F ∧ ¬logG),
but we do not pursue this superﬁcial analogy further in this paper.
3The formalization is available at http://github.com/dankoi/metamath/tree/master/highschool.
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B ∋ b ::= p | d C ∋ c ::= 1 | bc1c2
D ∋ d ::= c1 + c2 | c + d E ∋ e ::= c | d
−⊕− : E → E → D
c1 ⊕ e2 := c1 + e2
(c11 + c12)⊕ e2 := c11 + (c12 + e2)
(c11 + d12)⊕ e2 := c11 + (d12 ⊕ e2)
−×− : C → C → C
1× c2 := c2
bc11c12 × c2 := b
c11(c12 × c2)
−⋊− : C → E → E
c1 ⋊ c2 := c1 × c2
c1 ⋊ (c21 + c22) := (c1 × c21) + (c1 × c22)
c1 ⋊ (c21 + d22) := (c1 × c21) + (c1 ⋊ d22)
− ↑ − : B → E → C
b ↑ c := bc1
b ↑ (c1 + c2) := (b
c11)× (bc21)
b ↑ (c1 + d2) := (b
c11)× (b ↑ d2)
− ⇑ − : C → E → C
1 ⇑ e2 := 1
bc11c12 ⇑ e2 := (b ↑ (c11 ⋊ e2))× (c12 ⇑ e2)
−⋉− : E → E → E
c1 ⋉ e2 := c1 ⋊ e2
(c11 + c12)⋉ e2 := (c11 ⋊ e2)⊕ (c12 ⋊ e2)
(c11 + d12)⋉ e2 := (c11 ⋊ e2)⊕ (d12 ⋉ e2)
‖−‖ : Formula→ E |−| : Formula→ C
‖p‖ := p11 |p| := p11
‖F ∨G‖ := ‖F‖ ⊕ ‖G‖ |F ∨G| := (|F | ⊕ |G|)11
‖F ∧G‖ := ‖F‖⋉ ‖G‖ |F ∧G| := |F | × |G|
‖F → G‖ := |G| ⇑ ‖F‖ |F → G| := |G| ⇑ ‖F‖
Figure 1. Formula normalization functions
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The functions ⋉ and ⋊ apply the left, correspondingly right, distributivity law.
They are meant to implement the following informal equations:
p⋉ d = p1 ⋊ d c⋊ p = cp1(
n∑
i=1
ci
)
⋉ d =
n∑
i=1
(ci ⋊ d) c⋊
n∑
i=1
ci =
n∑
i=1
cci.
Finally, the functions ⇑ and ↑ normalize exponentiations following (10), (11) and
(12), in order for the following informal equations to hold:
b ↑ p = bp
1
b ⇑ e = b ↑ e
b ↑
n∑
i=1
ci =
n∏
i=1
bci
(
n≥0∏
i=1
bi
ci
)
⇑ e =
n≥0∏
i=1
(bi ↑ (ci ⋉ e)) .
In order to prove Theorem 1, we shall need to establish the following lemma on
formal equalities, where “=” denotes definitional equality modulo commutativity
of multiplication.
Lemma 1. The following equations hold for the normalization functions defined in
Figure 1:
c× 1 = c (13)
c1 × (c2 × c3) = (c1 × c2)× c3 (14)
d⊕ (e2 ⊕ e3) = (d⊕ e2)⊕ e3 (15)
e1 ⊕ (e2 ⊕ e3) = (e1 ⊕ e2)⊕ e3 (16)
c⋊ (d⊕ e) = (c⋊ d)⊕ (c⋊ e) (17)
c⋊ (e1 ⊕ e2) = (c⋊ e1)⊕ (c⋊ e2) (18)
(d⊕ e1)⋉ e2 = (d⋉ e2)⊕ (e1 ⋉ e2) (19)
(e0 ⊕ e1)⋉ e2 = (e0 ⋉ e2)⊕ (e1 ⋉ e2) (20)
1⋊ e = e (21)
c1 ⋊ (c2 ⋊ d) = (c1 × c2)⋊ d (22)
c1 ⋊ (c2 ⋊ e) = (c1 × c2)⋊ e (23)
c⋊ (d⋉ e) = (c⋊ d)⋉ e (24)
c⋊ (e1 ⋉ e2) = (c⋊ e1)⋉ e2 (25)
d⋉ (e1 ⋉ e2) = (d⋉ e1)⋉ e2 (26)
e1 ⋉ (e2 ⋉ e3) = (e1 ⋉ e2)⋉ e3 (27)
c ⇑ 1 = c (28)
(c1 × c2) ⇑ e = (c1 ⇑ e)× (c2 ⇑ e) (29)
b ↑ (d⊕ e) = (b ↑ d)× (b ↑ e) (30)
b ↑ (e1 ⊕ e2) = (b ↑ e1)× (b ↑ e2) (31)
b ↑ (e1 ⋉ e2) = (b ↑ e1) ⇑ e2 (32)
c ⇑ (e1 ⋉ e2) = (c ⇑ e1) ⇑ e2 (33)
c ⇑ (e1 ⊕ e2) = (c ⇑ e1)× (c ⇑ e2) (34)
c ⇑ ((e1 ⊕ e2)⋉ e3) = (c ⇑ (e1 ⋉ e3))× (c ⇑ (e2 ⋉ e3)) (35)
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p ↑ (p1 ⋊ e)
(axiom)
c1 ⇑ e
(c1 + c2) ↑ e
(∨1r)
c2 ⇑ e
(c1 + c2) ↑ e
(∨2r)
c ⇑ (‖F‖⋉ (p⋊ e))
c ⇑ ((|F | ⇑ p)⋊ (p⋊ e))
(→Pl )
((|G| ⇑ e1) ⇑ ((|H | ⇑ ‖G‖)⋊ e2))× (c ⇑ (‖H‖⋉ e2))
c ⇑ ((|H | ⇑ (|G| ⇑ e1))⋊ e2)
(→→l )
Figure 2. Proof rules of the High-school sequent calculus (HS) for G4ip
Proof. The proofs proceed as follows: (13) by induction on c; (14) by induction on
c1; (15) by induction on d; (16) by case analysis on e1, e2, e3 and using (15); (17) by
induction on d; (18) by case analysis on e1, e2 and using (17); (19) by induction on
d and using (16); (20) by case analysis on e1, e2 and using (19); (21) by induction
on e; (22) by induction on d and using (16); (23) by case analysis on e and using
(22) and (16); (24) by induction on d and using (18) and (23); (25) by case analysis
on e1 and using (24) and (23); (26) by induction on d and using (20) and (25);
(27) by case analysis on e1 and using (25) and (26); (28) by induction on c and
using (13); (29) by induction on c1 and using (14); (30) by induction on d; (31) by
induction on e1 and using (30); (32) by induction on e1 and using (13) and (31);
(33) by induction on c and using (29), (32), and (25); (34) by induction on c and
using (18) and (31); (35) by using (20) and (34).
It may be interesting to notice that in fact (34) is the only case that depends
on the commutativity of multiplication, while the other equations have been estab-
lished in Coq as definitional equalities. One can obtain a completely intensional
version of the normalization function if one is willing to integrate into the defini-
tion of × a conditional expression for performing merge sort and producing results
invariant over commutativity. 
Armed with a precise and terminating transformation of formulas, we can now
state the HS variant of G4ip in Figure 2. Notice that our calculus consists of non-
invertible rules only, tagged with the tag of the G4ip rule they correspond to (to
be shown in Theorem 1 below). The rules (→Pl ) and (→
→
l ) mention usual formulas
F,G,H . This is done on purpose, so that the correspondence to G4ip rules is
as tight as possible. If one wants to mention only formulas from the normalized
classes, one can consider the following reformulations of the rules,
c ⇑ (∂c0 ⋉ (p⋊ e))
c ⇑ ((c0 ⇑ p)⋊ (p⋊ e))
(→Pl ’)
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((c2 ⇑ e1) ⇑ ((c1 ⇑ ∂c2)⋊ e2))× (c ⇑ (∂c1 ⋉ e2))
c ⇑ ((c1 ⇑ (c2 ⇑ e1))⋊ e2)
, (→→l ’)
where ∂ denotes the map |F | 7→ ‖F‖ that distributes the product over the sums of
the form (c1+ · · ·+ cn)
1 in |F |; here, the exponent 1 is used to suspend normaliza-
tion, that is, permit the isomorphism (11) to be applied before (6) at the base of
exponentiation.
Note also, that the normalization functions disappear from any concrete proof
in HS notation. The functions are there merely for a compact presentation of the
rules. For instance, considering the case of the (→→l )-rule from HS, where c := p
1,
c1 := p
1, c2 := q
1, e1 := r
1, e2 := s
1, and p, q, r, s are prime formulas, we retrieve
just the corresponding G4ip rule in polynomial notation,(
qr
1pq
11s111
)(
pp
1s111
)
ppq
r111s11
,
or the more readable one, by a harmless abuse of notation involving 1:(
qrp
qs
)
(pps)
ppq
r
s
.
For a concrete example of the rules involving disjunction, consider the case where
c1 := p
1, c2 := q
1, e := r1 + s1, and the concrete and 1-simplified instance of the
(∨1r) rule:
prps
(p+ q)
r
(p+ q)
s .
We shall now show in which sense HS is a version of G4ip. This will also imply
that HS is a proof system complete for intuitionistic provability.
Theorem 1. Every derivation of F in G4ip can be transformed to a derivation of
‖F‖ in HS.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation. At each case, we first apply
(13) and (21) of Lemma 1 to slightly simplify the involved expressions. Then, the
non-invertible rules, (axiom), (∨1r), (∨
2
r), (→
P
l ), and (→
→
l ), are directly proven by
their HS correspondent rule. As for the invertible rules:
• (→r) is proven by (33);
• (∧r) is proven by (29);
• (∨l) is proven by (35);
• (→∧l ) is proven also by (33);
• and, (→∨l ) is proven by (34).

Remark 1. Since F ∼= ‖F‖, the transformation of a G4ip proof into an HS one is
loss-less, in the sense that it preserves the essence of the original proof modulo a
given notion of identity of proofs. That is, it should not be too hard to define a
reverse transformation of HS-proofs into G4ip proofs, such that the composition of
the two transformations would identify G4ip proofs up to a certain equality theory
on proofs. We have not done that formally, for it should be more as less clear (ex.
from the two examples before the theorem, or the one that follows) that HS can be
seen as a fragment of G4ip.
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Although it may appear to be complex to transform G4ip proofs to HS proofs,
when one wants to formally apply the normalization functions of Figure 1, this
transformation is actually quite easy and can be efficiently also performed by hand
using high-school arithmetic. We give an example to show how it works.
Example 1. The following G4ip derivation of r ∧ (q → (r ∨ t)→ s)→ q → s,
sqrss
t axiom
sqrs
rst
(→Pl )
sqrs
r+t
(→∨l )
sqr(s
r+t)q
(→Pl )
(sq)
r(sr+t)
q (→r)
is mapped to the following HS derivation:
sqrss
t axiom
sqrs
rst
(→Pl )
sqrs
rqstq
(→Pl )
.
In Section 4, we shall extend this representation of intuitionistic formulas by
exponential polynomials to the first-order quantifiers.
3. The Inequality Interpretation of Inference Rules
In this section, we will show that the inference rules for G4ip can be interpreted
as inequalities relating the exponential polynomials corresponding to the premises
and the conclusion. This extends the previous observation that invertible rules are
equalities.
We start by exploring the inequality interpretation of G4ip, in order to keep the
presentation somewhat simple. The main result will be the following.
Theorem 2. Let R be an inference rule of G4ip. If the variables F,G,H, I, P
are interpreted to be natural numbers strictly greater than 1, then the value of the
premise of the rule is less than or equal to the value of the conclusion. Moreover,
the inequality is strict if and only if R is not invertible.
Formally, we define an interpretation function [[−]] that maps formulas and con-
texts to natural numbers. The function is defined as follows:
[[F ∨G]] = [[F ]] + [[G]] [[F ∧G]] = [[F ]] · [[G]]
[[G→ F ]] = [[F ]][[G]] [[Γ, F ]] = [[Γ]] · [[F ]]
[[P ]] = 2 [[⊤]] = [[·]] = 1
Note that with this interpretation, we have the following property:
Lemma 2. If [[F ]] = 1 then F ∼= ⊤.
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the structure of formulas. 
This observation justifies our assumption that when we apply an inference rule,
the variables involved must have a value greater than or equal to 2. For instance,
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consider the (→→l ) rule. Here, we could have F,G,H = P , Γ = ·, and I = ⊤, which
would result in the following interpretation:
(22)2
2·1 · 12·1
122
2
·1
Clearly, the premise does not have a smaller value than the conclusion, hence the
inequality interpretation does not work, unless we assume all the variables (except
the one corresponding to Γ) have values greater than 2.
Note, however, that this is an entirely reasonable assumption given the content
of Lemma 2. If I = ⊤, there is no reason to apply the (→→l ), as we already know
⊤ is provable4. Thus, we will assume that the formulas and contexts in question
have been subjected to the following simplification rules first:
⊤ ∧ F  F F ∧ ⊤  F
⊤ → F  F F → ⊤  ⊤
Γ,⊤  Γ
These simplifications correspond to the high-school identities (7), (8), and (9). Note
that we do not need to reduce occurrences of ⊤ inside disjunctions, as [[F ∨G]] ≥ 2
for all formulas F,G. This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 3. For all formulas F , either [[F ]] ≥ 2 or F  ∗ ⊤.
Proof. By induction on the structure of F . We show here a representative case. If
F = G → H , we apply the induction hypothesis to H . If H  ∗ ⊤, then F  ∗ ⊤
by the definition of  . If not, we have [[H ]] ≥ 2, and thus
[[G→ H ]] = [[H ]][[G]] ≥ 2[[G]] ≥ 2,
by using the fact that [[H ]] ≥ 2 and [[G]] ≥ 1 respectively. 
Alternatively, one can simply replace all occurrences of ⊤ with any formula with
a unique proof, such as P → P for some fresh atomic formula P .
In the rest of this section, we will omit the interpretation function, as it will be
obvious from the context whether we are talking about the formula or the interpre-
tation to which it is mapped.
Let us now return to the inference rules of G4ip. The fact that the invertible
rules preserve the value of the sequents is immediate by inspection of the inference
rules. For instance, for the (∨l) rule, we would need to show that
H(F+G)Γ = HFΓHGΓ,
but this is a simple arithmetical equality. This leaves the matter of establishing
the non-invertible rules as strict inequalities. For the (∨1r) and (∨
2
r) rules, this is
immediate, as F +G > F and F +G > G whenever F,G ≥ 1.
For the (→Pl ) rule, we have that F ≇ ⊤ and thus F ≥ 2. As P is an atomic
formula, its interpretation is 2, and thus
FP = F 2 > F and hence
GF
PPΓ > GFPΓ by monotonicity.
4In fact, modern presentations of G4ip omit ⊤ as a formula entirely, as it — from a proof
search perspective — is completely superﬂuous.
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This leaves the inequality associated to the (→→l ) rule, for which we will need a
few lemmas first:
Lemma 4. If the inequality 2H
GF −H > GFH
G
holds for all G,H, F ≥ 2, then
IH
GF Γ > (GF )H
GΓIHΓ for all F,G,H, I ≥ 2 and Γ ≥ 1.
Proof. We reason as follows:
2H
GF −H > GFH
G
by assumption.
IH
GF −H > GFH
G
as I ≥ 2.
I(H
GF −H)Γ > GFH
GΓ by raising each side to the power Γ.
IH
GF Γ−HΓ > GFH
GΓ by distributivity.
IH
GF Γ > GFH
GΓIHΓ by multiplying with IHΓ.
IH
GF Γ > (GF )H
GΓIHΓ by the high-school identity.

Next, we need a few further lemmas in order to discharge the assumption in the
preceding lemma:
Lemma 5. Given F,H ≥ 2 and G ≥ 3, the following inequalities hold:
GF −G− 1 ≥ GF−1 (36)
2G
F−1
≥ FG (37)
FHGG ≥ FHG−1G+ 1 (38)
Proof. To prove (36), we reason as follows:
GF−2 ≥ G2−2 = G0 = 1 as F ≥ 2.
3GF−2 − 1 > GF−2 as 3n− 1 > n when n ≥ 1.
GF−1 − 1 > GF−2 as G ≥ 3.
GF −G > GF−1 by multiplying with G.
GF −G ≥ GF−1 + 1 as G,F ∈ N.
GF −G− 1 ≥ GF−1 by rearranging.
Next, to prove (37), will do this in two steps: First, we note that the inequality
holds when F = 2. To show this, we need to show that 2G
2−1
= 2G ≥ 2G, that
is 2G−1 ≥ G, which is clear when G ≥ 2. Next, we observe that if the inequality
holds for some F , then it also holds with F + 1 substituted in place of F . For the
right hand side of the inequality, this gives a difference of (F +1)G−FG = G. For
the left hand side, we reason as follows:
2G
F
− 2G
F−1
≥ 2G
2
− 2G
2−1
as F ≥ 2.
= (2G)G − 2G by the high-school identities.
≥ (2G)2 − 2G as G ≥ 2.
= 2G(2G − 1)
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≥ G as 2G ≥ G and 2G − 1 ≥ 1.
As we have now established that
2G
F
− 2G
F−1
≥ (F + 1)G− FG
for all F ≥ 2, the desired result follows from a straightforward induction on F .
Finally, to establish (38), we reason as follows:
FHG−1G(H − 1) ≥ 1 as F,G,H ≥ 2.
FHGG ≥ FHG−1G+ 1 by rearranging.

We can now establish the final lemma:
Lemma 6. For all F,G,H ≥ 2, we have 2H
GF −H > GFH
G
.
Proof. We first prove this in the case where G ≥ 3:
2G
F−1
≥ FG by (37).
2G
F−G−1 ≥ FG as GF −G− 1 ≥ GF−1 by (36).
HG
F−G−1 ≥ FG as H ≥ 2.
HG
F−1 ≥ FHGG by multiplying with HG.
HG
F−1 ≥ FHG−1G+ 1 by (38) and transitivity.
HG
F
−1 − 1 ≥ FHG−1G
HG
F
−H ≥ FHGG by multiplying with H .
2H
GF −H ≥ 2FH
GG by monotonicity.
2H
GF −H ≥ (2G)FH
G
by the high-school identity.
2H
GF −H > GFH
G
as 2G > G when G ≥ 2.
This takes care of the case when G ≥ 3. In the case when G = 2, we need to show
the following strict inequality:
2H
2F −H > 2FH
2
First, we will establish the inequality
22
F−2 − F > 1
To do so, we note that it holds when F = 2, and all that is needed, then, is to
establish that the expression 22
F−2 − F is monotonic in F for all F ≥ 2. Looking
at successive differences, we get(
22
F+1−2 − (F + 1)
)
−
(
22
F−2 − F
)
= 22
F+1−2 − 22
F−2 − 1
≥ 22
3−2 − 22
2−2 − 1
= 26 − 22 − 1 > 0
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whence the expression is monotonic in F . We can now complete the argument as
follows:
22
F−2 − F > 1 by the preceding argument.
H2
F−2 − F > 1 as H ≥ 2.
H(H2
F
−2 − F ) > 1 by multiplying with H .
H2
F
−1 − FH > 1 by simplification.
H2
F−1 − 1 > FH by rearranging.
H2
F
−H > FH2 by multiplying with H .
2H
2F −H > 2FH
2
by monotonicity.
This concludes the proof. 
Combining the above lemmas, we now get Theorem 2 as a straightforward con-
sequence.
Using this theorem, we can prove as an easy corollary that proof search using
the rules of G4ip is terminating. Because none of the rules increase the value of the
interpretation of sequents, and because the non-invertible rules strictly decrease this
value, it follows that the number of non-invertible rules in a derivation is bounded
by a function of the value of the goal sequent. Thus, to prove termination, it is
sufficient to prove that the invertible rules alone are terminating, and this is a
straightforward exercise.
The traditional way of showing G4ip is terminating is also done by assigning
a measure to each sequent, but for this, it is sufficient to show that the measure
decreases along any branch of the proof tree. In our presentation, we have blurred
the distinction between the meta-level conjunction (i.e. multiple premises) and that
of the object level, as motivated by the corresponding equations for exponential
polynomials.
Finally, let us briefly remark on how to extend the above result to the HS sequent
calculus. The first step is to note that the normalization functions shown in Figure 1
all preserve the value of the interpretation. Thus, all that is needed is to show
that the inference rules must strictly decrease the associated values. In this case,
however, the necessary inequalities are exactly the ones we established previously,
and as the HS sequent calculus only has non-invertible rules, termination of proof
search is immediate. Note that this again requires all occurrences of ⊤ to have been
simplified away.
4. An Intuitionistic Arithmetical Hierarchy
In classical first-order logic, every formula is equivalent to a formula in prenex
normal form. This is possible thanks to the classical tautologies,
∀xF ∨G↔ ∀x(F ∨G) (where x 6∈ FV(G))
∃xF ∧G↔ ∃x(F ∧G) (where x 6∈ FV(G))
∀xF ∧G↔ ∀x(F ∧G)
∃xF ∨G↔ ∃x(F ∨G)
¬∃xF ↔ ∀x¬F
AN INTUITIONISTIC FORMULA HIERARCHY BASED ON HIGH-SCHOOL IDENTITIES 15
¬∀xF ↔ ∃x¬F,
that allow pushing the quantifiers to the front of a formula. In intuitionistic logic,
half of these rules are not valid. Nevertheless, the other half are not only equiva-
lences but even isomorphisms. We can also write the more general:
∀xF ∧ ∀xG ∼= ∀x(F ∧G) (39)
∃xF ∨ ∃xG ∼= ∃x(F ∨G) (40)
∃xF → G ∼= ∀x(F → G) (where x 6∈ FV(G)). (41)
To see why these isomorphisms hold, it is easiest to consider a natural deduction
proof system, when formal proof are terms of a suitable typed lambda calculus (see
for instance the intuitionistic fragment of Table 2 from [9]) and take identity of
proofs, ≡, to be the standard =βη-relation for the lambda calculus with pair types
(conjunction) and sum types (disjunction). One also has terms for ∃-introduction
(〈x, p〉), ∃-elimination (dest p as(x.b) in q), ∀-introduction (λx.p) and ∀-elimination
(px), and additional rules for β- and η-equality of terms for the quantifiers,
(λx.p)t =β p{t/x}
dest 〈t, p〉 as(x.a) in q =β q{t/x}{p/q}
p =η λx.px
p{q/a} =η dest q as(x.b) in p{〈x, b〉/a},
that are analogues of the β- and η-rules concerning function types and sum types.
Given this notation, for instance, the isomorphism
∃xF → G ∼= ∀x(F → G)
can be established using two proof terms,
λa.λx.λb.a〈x, b〉 (φ)
λc.λd. dest d as(y.e) in cye, (ψ)
by showing that λc.φ(ψc) =βη λc.c and λa.ψ(φa) =βη λa.a:
(λa.λx.λb.a〈x, b〉)(λd. dest d as(y.e) in cye) =β
λx.λb. dest 〈x, b〉 as(y.e) in cye =β λx.λb.cxb =η c
(λc.λd. dest d as(y.e) in cye)(λx.λb.a〈x, b〉) =β
λd. dest d as(y.e) in a〈y, e〉 =η λd.(aa0){d/a0} = λd.ad =η a
Similarly, we can show that a further formula isomorphism holds,
G→ ∀xF ∼= ∀x(G→ F ), (42)
when x /∈ FV(G). Namely, one can take as witnessing terms the following ones:
λa.λx.λb.abx (φ)
λc.λd.λx.cxd. (ψ)
Given the first-order formula isomorphisms (39), (40), (41), and (42), we shall
now adopt an extended exponential polynomial notation of formulas involving quan-
tifiers. We write ∃xF as xF and ∀xF as F x, the distinction between conjunctions
and existential quantifiers, and implications and universal quantifiers, being made
by a variable convention: we “left-multiply” and “exponentiate” by x, y, z in order
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to express quantifiers, while if we do it with F,G, it means that we are making
a conjunction and implication with a generic formula. Using this notation, the
isomorphisms (39)-(42) acquire the form of the following equations:
(FG)x = F xGx (39’)
x(F +G) = xF + xG (40’)
GxF = (GF )x (where x /∈ FV(G)) (41’)
(F x)G = (FG)x (where x /∈ FV(G)) (42’)
This extension of HSI with rules involving the extended exponential polynomials
thus still implies formula isomorphism. And now we can give an interpretation of
the invertible proof rules involving the quantifiers that respect this notation:
Γ→ F
Γ→ ∀xF
(FΓ)x
(F x)Γ
for all x /∈ FV(Γ) (∀r)
F,Γ→ G
∃xF,Γ→ G
(
GFΓ
)x
GxFΓ
for all x /∈ FV(G,Γ). (∃l)
As the invertible rules are equalities, an extension of HS from Section 2 for the first-
order case can be defined in the same way as before, by applying a normalization
function (see Figure 3) to the premises and conclusions of the non-invertible rules
for quantifiers. Working with the first-order extension G4i [10] of G4ip, one would
have the HS variants of the rules (L∀), (R∃), (L∀⊃), while the invertible rule (L∃⊃)
can be handled using the isomorphism (41).
We have not pursued formally showing an extension of Lemma 1, mostly for
technical reasons having to do with formalizing syntax with binders.5 Hence, we
do not propose to establish formally a first-order analogue of Theorem 1 here.
What we consider as a more important consequence of the extended exponential
polynomial interpretation of the quantifiers is the fact that it leads to a simple
normal form i.e. a simple intuitionistic “arithmetical” hierarchy that classifies in-
tuitionistic first-order formulas up to isomorphism.
This interpretation suggests trying to obtain a normal form of first-order formulas
by sometimes pushing the quantifiers in, rather than always pushing them out, like
in the approach for classical logic. Our approach will lead to a normal form theorem
which implies that a hierarchy of formulas exists for intuitionistic logic, which not
only preserves strong equivalence of formulas (and hence proof identity), but is
comparatively as simple as the classical arithmetical hierarchy.
Theorem 3. For every first-order formula F , there is an isomorphic formula e ∈
Σ ∪ Π, where the classes Σ, Π, and B are defined simultaneously as follows,
Σ ∋ d ::= c1 ∨ · · · ∨ cn (n ≥ 2)
Π ∋ c ::= ∀x1(c1 → b1) ∧ · · · ∧ ∀xn(cn → bn) (n ≥ 0)
B ∋ b ::= p | d | ∃xc,
or, in extended exponential polynomial notation:
Σ ∋ d ::=
n≥2∑
i=1
ci Π ∋ c ::=
n≥0∏
i=1
(bcii )
xi B ∋ b ::= p | d | xc,
5Apart from the fact that we do not use it for formal proofs, the Coq deﬁnition of the functions
from Figure 3 is simple and can be used to compute the formula normal form.
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B ∋ b ::= p | d | xc Π = C ∋ c ::= 1 | (bc1)
x1 c2
Σ = D ∋ d ::= c1 + c2 | c + d E ∋ e ::= c | d
Vars ∋ x ::= x1, . . . , xn | ǫ
−×− : C → C → C
1× c2 := c2
(bc11)
x
c12 × c2 := (b
c11)
x
(c12 × c2)
− ↑− − : B → Vars→ E → C
b ↑x ((yc)11) := (bc)
x,y
1
b ↑x c := (bc)
x
1
b ↑x (c1 + c2) := ((b
c1)x1)× ((bc2)x1)
b ↑x (c1 + d2) := ((b
c1)x1)× (b ↑x d2)
− ⇑ − : C → E → C
1 ⇑ e2 := 1
(bc11)xc12 ⇑ e2 := (b ↑
x (c11 ⋊ e2))× (c12 ⇑ e2)
− ∝ − : Vars→ E → E
x ∝ c := xc
x ∝ (c1 + c2) := xc1 + xc2
x ∝ (c1 + d2) := xc1 + x ∝ d2
− − : C → Vars→ C
1 x := 1
((bc1)yc2) 
x := (bc1)y,x(c2 
x)
‖−‖ : Formula→ E |−| : Formula→ C
‖p‖ := p11 |p| := p11
‖F ∨G‖ := ‖F‖ ⊕ ‖G‖ |F ∨G| := (|F | ⊕ |G|)11
‖F ∧G‖ := ‖F‖⋉ ‖G‖ |F ∧G| := |F | × |G|
‖F → G‖ := |G| ⇑ ‖F‖ |F → G| := |G| ⇑ ‖F‖
‖∃xF ‖ := x ∝ ‖F‖ |∃xF | := x |F |
‖∀xF ‖ := |F | x |∀xF | := |F | x
Figure 3. Extension of Figure 1 for the quantifiers
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where p denotes a prime formula, and x a (potentially empty) list of first-order
variables.
Proof. The implementation in Figure 3 is structurally recursive, hence terminating,
and with range Σ ∪ Π. 
As we mentioned, unlike the classical hierarchy that always pushes out the quan-
tifiers – proceeding on (half of) the same equations – the proposed intuitionistic
hierarchy partly pushes them in ((39) and (40)) and partly pushes them out ((41)
and (42)).
Also, while the classical hierarchy proceeds in levels Σ0n
/
Π0n along a linear order
for n, for our hierarchy, it is not clear whether one can define such an order; the
level of a formula in Π would depend both on the level of its subformula in Π and
on the level of its subformula in B.
5. Conclusion
The reduction of logic to high-school arithmetic is the general contribution of
this paper. Such a reduction is not in itself a new idea, present ever since Go¨del’s
Dialectica interpretation of intuitionistic logic for extracting computational content
from proofs. However, in this paper we employ it to study the structure of proofs
and formula equivalence, allowing a fresh perspective on intuitionistic proof theory
and a first link to other areas of computer science and mathematics, which one
could potentially exploit to obtain new results in Logic.
Indeed, as we saw, seeing proof rules as relations (inequalities) between expo-
nential polynomials allowed us to define HS. As far as we know, this is the first
proof formalism for intuitionistic logic that dispenses with invertible proof rules.
We thus believe it to be a fresh contribution to the study of identity of proofs [1],
an open problem identified already by Kreisel [11] and Prawitz [12]. Proving that
HS-notation alone is enough to define identity of proofs is a topic of future work.
In a related unpublished work [8], we have studied the equational theory of =βη
for the lambda calculus with sum types (i.e. intuitionistic natural deduction), after
terms are coerced to a type normal form similar to the one shown in Figure 1. A
new decomposition of =βη is proposed there, from which one can also see that the
permutations of invertible rules are an obstacle for comparing derivations, and that
a natural deduction calculus is less suitable than a sequent calculus for studying
proof identities.
The idea that invertible proof rules of sequent calculus should be treated in
blocks, inside which the order of application of rules does not matter, is present
in the approach to focused sequent calculi such as Liang and Miller’s intuitionistic
system LJF [2], inspired by previous work on linear logic by Andreoli [13]. The dif-
ference between our approach and LJF is that working on the top-most connectives
of a sequent (formula) does not allow one to apply all applicable type isomorphisms
as sequent transformations, and, as a consequence, a focusing proof proceeds in an
alternation of invertible and non-invertible blocks of proof rules – the invertible
rules still being present.
As we have shown, all the rules of the HS calculus are interpreted as strict in-
equalities of natural numbers when atoms are instantiated with appropriately cho-
sen values. Because our exponential polynomials are manifestly monotonic when
interpreted as functions (i.e. if f(x) is an exponential polynomial containing the
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variable x, and n ≤ m, then f(n) ≤ f(m)), one might consider allowing the appli-
cation of the inference rules in Figure 2 not only at the top level of the sequent,
but also deeply inside the formulas themselves. This could lead to a deep infer-
ence [14] calculus in the style of G4ip. Moreover, because of the aforementioned
monotonicity, it should be possible to extend the results of Section 3 to ensure
that this calculus is terminating as well. Note that intuitionistic calculi presented
as deep inference systems (see e.g. [15]) usually have an explicit contraction rule,
which precludes such a termination argument.
Compared to more traditional sequent calculi, HS is maybe closer to Vorob’ev’s
original calculus [16], that contains distributivity proof rules (i.e. (6)), than Dyck-
hoff’s [3] and Hudelmaier’s [17], which do not apply such proof rules.
Furthermore, we showed that the inequality interpretation allows us to formulate
a simple termination argument for proof search in intuitionistic propositional logic.
This could be potentially useful for automated and inductive theorem proving.
Finally, the formula hierarchy from Section 4 appears to be the first systematic
classification of first-order formulas up to isomorphism. One could also argue that
it is the simplest hierarchy for intuitionistic logic so far and reminiscent of the
classical arithmetical hierarchy. Our hierarchy could also be used as an alternative
one in the context of classical logic, for the cases where the desirable equivalence
of formulas is not the classical one but isomorphism, however, it is not clear at this
moment whether there is a meaningful (non-degenerated) notion of proof identity
for classical proof systems.
Previous intuitionistic hierarchies that we know of are the ones of Mints [18],
Leivant [19], Burr [20], and Fleischmann [21]. Mints’ classification of formulas is
restricted to ones not containing negative occurrences of quantifiers, with the aim
of showing complexity bounds on termination of proof search; this line of work
has recently been continued by Schubert, Urzyczyn, and Zdanowski [22]. Leivant
defined formula classes for intuitionistic logic based on implicational complexity,
that is the depth of negative nestings of implications. Burr proposes a formula class
Φn, that over classical logic coincides with the class Π
0
1 of the arithmetical hierarchy,
however he gives no “reasonable counterpart” for the classes Σ0n when n ≥ 2.
Fleischmann introduces inductive operators for universal, U(·, ·), and existential,
E(·), closure of sets of formulas, showing they can be used to obtain a number of
different hierarchies, one of them coinciding with Burr’s hierarchy, and then uses
these operators to obtain model theoretic preservation theorems. It is not clear
how to obtain our hierarchy using Fleischmann’s operators, in the form in which
they are given; also, our hierarchy classifies formulas modulo isomorphism, not only
modulo equivalence.
It might also be interesting to notice a connection with the class of coherent
or geometric formulas [23]: using our notation, they can be written in the form
(x1c1 + · · · + xncn)
p1···pm ∈ C. Whether any of the characteristic properties of
geometric formulas can be generalized to work on formulas in our normal form,
remains to be seen.
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